Divergent Narratives on Chinese Internet Censorship: Western-centric versus Local Perspectives by Deutmeyer, Dana
Divergent Narratives on Chinese Internet Censorship:
Western-centric versus Local Perspectives
A thesis




IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS




brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by University of Minnesota Digital Conservancy
© Dana Lee Deutmeyer 2021
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge the support and contributions
from my advisor and committee members. Committee member Professor Jason McGrath
initially introduced me to the topic of Chinese Internet censorship through one of his
classes, provided substantial references on the topic, and encouraged me to approach the
topic from a different perspective than simply writing about the mechanisms of
censorship. Committee member Professor Joachim Savelsberg’s input was essential in
helping to frame my argument sociologically and has been a constant source of support
throughout the writing process. My primary advisor, Professor Ning Ma’s, dedication and
feedback, especially towards the end of my revisions, was invaluable to the successful
completion of my thesis.
I would also like to thank all of my peer reviewers, all of whom made helpful and
relevant contributions to various aspects of my thesis. A special thank you goes to my
peer reviewer and former classmate, Sutina Chou, for her very detailed suggestions.
Lastly, I could not have completed this thesis without the unwavering
encouragement and advice from my mother, Dr. Shin Lee, who read every revision and
spent countless hours with me discussing my thesis. My appreciation for her support
cannot possibly be overstated.
ⅰ
Abstract
Chinese Internet censorship refers to the Chinese government’s policies that
attempt to control the circulation of online information. Internet censorship as a focus of
study produces multiple, incongruent perspectives, especially among Western academics
and authors. This thesis discusses “black-and-white” and “shades-of-grey” perspectives
of Chinese Internet censorship. “Black and white” perspectives present Internet
censorship as necessarily being oppressive, and are informed by Western-centric biases
rooted in an ideologized, essentialized view of democratic principles and Orientalism.
“Shades of grey” perspectives emphasize understanding censorship from a local
perspective, including how it prompts the development of certain online behaviors. Under
the umbrella of Chinese censorship lies various aspects, including the goal of the
government to prevent collective action, as well as the underlying motivation of
producing a shared understanding of reality. It also includes how netizens experience
Internet censorship, how they react to it, and the influences it has on online culture.
Importantly, this discussion of Chinese Internet censorship also considers how the West
interprets it, which is usually in a very critical manner, as censorship is viewed as
antithetical to Western-centric essentialized values of democracy and freedom.
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Chinese Internet censorship refers to the Chinese government’s policies that
attempt to control the circulation of online information. As a general rule, censorship is
an inherent and unavoidable aspect of China’s Internet. However, while Internet
censorship does restrict free speech, its ability to totally censor speech online is often
overstated. Internet censorship as a focus of study produces multiple, incongruent
perspectives, especially among Western academics and authors.
This thesis discusses “black-and-white” and “shades-of-grey” perspectives of
Chinese Internet censorship. “Black and white” perspectives present Internet
censorship as necessarily being oppressive, and are informed by Western-centric
biases rooted in an ideologized, essentialized view of democratic principles and
Orientalism. “Shades of grey” perspectives emphasize understanding censorship
from a local perspective, including how it prompts the development of certain online
behaviors.
In general, the goal of this thesis is not to characterize China’s Internet, or its
censorship, as something that is beneficial or disagreeable. Rather, it is to analyze how
netizens (Internet citizens, or regular participants in the online sphere) experience
censorship, as well as how various parties in the West perceive Chinese Internet
censorship. The terms “West or “Western” are used throughout this thesis and refer to the
geographic area of Western Europe, Canada, Australia, and the United States, the latter of
which produces many of the books, articles, and other publications referenced in this
work.
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Specifically, this thesis reviews frameworks used to understand Internet
censorship, the rationale behind censorship, and the actors of Internet censorship. Lastly,
it presents a case study of Internet censorship that incorporates these various aspects.
II. Literature Review
The literature on Chinese Internet censorship reveals incongruities between
West-centric writings and local experiences. This literature review discusses these
inconsistencies in relation to the divergent  narratives of Chinese Internet censorship,
collective action, self-censorship, and recent developments and effects of Internet
censorship in China.
Divergent Narratives on Chinese Internet Censorship
Some authors depict the Chinese Internet as being very restricted due to
censorship. Literature that emphasizes censorship’s restrictiveness in a larger
conversation about the Chinese Internet tends to fall under the “black and white” body of
literature. Kai Strittmatter’s book, We Have Been Harmonized: Life in China’s
Surveillance State, provides a clear example of Western literature that misrepresents the
relationship between the Chinese state and its citizens, portraying Internet censorship as a
tool exclusively used by the state to maintain power (2020). Strittmatter only provides a
very shallow overview of China’s Internet policies, while writing in a way that caters
more to Western audiences looking to critique China, rather than gain an actual
understanding of Chinese Internet culture. For instance, Strittmatter uses non-neutral,
provocative language throughout, such as describing the Chinese Communist Party
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(CCP) as using “mind control techniques” on the Internet (2020, 52), and going so far as
to call China’s society “sick” (2020, 242).
Western mainstream media also tends to present the narrative that Chinese
Internet censorship is both very restricting and antithetical to Western values. This
narrative often reflects positions expressed in “black and white” literature, resulting in
Western media presenting a one-sided view of the Chinese Internet to its readership.
Elizabeth Economy’s article, published in The Guardian, details the almost-unfailing
ability of the Chinese government to censor disagreeable content, as well as the threat
Chinese Internet policy presents to the West (2018a). Economy writes, “For the
international community, Beijing’s cyber-policy is a sign of the challenge that a more
powerful China presents to the liberal world order, which prioritizes values such as
freedom of speech” (2018a). Whereas some Western authors describe Chinese Internet
censorship as based on essentialized liberal democratic values, other scholars present
censorship from a more local perspective, narrating how it is experienced by Chinese
netizens.
A disconnect exists between how the West views Chinese Internet censorship, and
how it is experienced in China. Primarily, this disconnect is a result of varying
understandings of the Internet’s “purpose.” Rongbin Han describes how Western studies
of China tend to misrepresent state censorship, resulting in misunderstandings of the
censorship system and its effects (2018, 182). Ying Jiang further addresses this conflict,
specifically describing how the West views the Internet as a democratizing force (Jiang
2012, 78-9). Specifically, since censorship places limitations on free expression – a value
held in high regard in Western democracies – Western literature and news media are
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quick to critique how Chinese censorship has stifled the democratic process often
associated with the Internet. In comparison, Chinese netizens generally do not desire to
have a democratic system of governance, and therefore do not view the Internet as a
catalyst for political change. Netizens, according to Jiang, are appreciative of their access
to the Internet despite it being censored, as the Internet as-is has already created an
exponentially freer space to discuss and gather information than anything that existed
pre-Internet (Jiang 2012, 5, 77). Han and Jiang’s work demonstrates how “shades of
grey” literature reveals the importance of looking at censorship from a local perspective,
rather than the more removed, reductive perspective that is often presented in Western
literature and media.
Collective Action
Currently, Western scholars argue that China’s main objective of Internet
censorship is to quiet incidents of collective action to prevent them from turning into
protests. Sociological frameworks are used by some Western scholars to analyze the
perspective of the Chinese state. Francesca Polletta uses the framework of rituals to
analyze the motivations of the government in suppressing collective action. Polletta
describes how public rituals, such as commemorations and holidays, have a history of
being appropriated by protesters, who then turn that ritual into an event for their own
cause (2004, 152). Furthermore, Polletta’s work also has specific relevance to China, as
she attributes the practice of quickly subduing events with collective action potential to
the Tiananmen Square Incident (2004, 194). While Polletta’s conversation about rituals
does present some insight into the larger sociological and historical factors that influence
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the CCP’s decision to censor collective action, it does not address local factors that affect
why the Chinese government focuses on censoring collective action events.
“Shades of grey” literature reveals that the CCP focuses primarily on censoring
collective action in particular due to the expansiveness of the Internet.  Han argues that
the Internet has made censorship a more difficult task for the Chinese state because it is
so expansive and widely-used (2018, 183-5). In addition, Han notes that netizens can use
the Internet as a platform for expression, despite censorship (2018, 183-5). Roiger
Creemers concurs with Han’s argument, specifically mentioning how, despite the fact that
the Chinese government uses the Internet to maintain control over the dissemination of
information, the Internet has evolved beyond the point of total control: “Social media
eroded the previous monopoly that the party-state enjoyed over the dissemination of
facts” (Creemers 2016, 97). In other words, as the Internet has grown so much since its
advent, it is not reasonable to attempt to censor everything, leading the CCP to focus on
censoring collective action.
Several authors argue that quieting collective action is the primary goal of Internet
censorship in China. King, Pan, and Roberts explain how the principal goal of Chinese
Internet censorship is to specifically remove conversations, postings, and information
about events or topics that could inspire collective action (2013, 1-2). Daniela Stockmann
describes how the Internet practices of the Chinese government can provide insight into
their goals, which revolve around preventing collective action and discussion (2010,
181). In general, this seems to be the consensus of many other scholars writing about
Chinese censorship (Economy, 2018; Guo 2020, 128; Lei 2017, 142-5; Poell 2015, 192;
Shirk 2010, 3; Qiang 2010, 209; Qin, Strömberg, and Wu 2017, 119-20; Xu 2017). King,
5
Pan, and Roberts’s research concluded that the CCP tended to over-censor sensitive
topics during “volume-bursts” of discussion about that topic, indicating that when
something became an important [read: critical, galvanizing] topic online, that is when
stricter censorship was implemented. Lei calls these volume-burst-creating incidents
“public opinion incidents” or “contentious experiences,” and also describes the goal of
Internet censorship to suppress conversation about such incidents or experiences (2017,
142-5, 162).
Self-censorship
Western-centric scholars depict censorship as a task solely undertaken by the
Chinese government. In their description of the mechanisms of Chinese Internet
censorship, Xu and Albert describe Internet censorship as something the government
does directly. For example, Xu and Albert write, “The Chinese government employs large
numbers of people to monitor and censor China’s media,” negating to mention the third
parties that are more directly involved with censorship (2009). Furthermore, Strittmatter
writes generalizing phrases such as “censors blocked,” but fails to elaborate on which
actor of censorship (the government or independent third parties) enacts those particular
censors (2020, 79). The phrasing that “black and white” authors employ in their
discussions of Chinese Internet censorship fails to acknowledge the multiple actors
involved in Internet censorship, instead portraying the CCP as being the primary
censoring actor. “Shades of grey” scholarship, on the other hand, indicates that
self-censorship, or the introduction of a third party in censorship apparatuses, is actually
more common in Chinese Internet censorship.
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Locally oriented inquiries reveal the significance of self-censorship as a primary
form of censorship. Self-censorship is the idea that independent (not state-run) Internet
and social media companies enact and enforce their own censorship regulations on their
users. Qiang describes an “essential component” of the CCP’s governing strategy to be
information control (Qiang 2010, 206). However, given the fragmented nature of the
government’s censorship agencies (Han 2018, 56; Lei 2017, 175), including the fact that
the state now shares control over the Internet with independent companies such as
Tencent and Sina, it is impossible for them to manually censor everything. This lack of
control resulted in the introduction of self-censorship. Self-censorship, or
“self-regulation” as Creemers calls it, is performed proactively by these companies to
ensure they fulfill licensing requirements, without which they could not operate in China
(Creemers 2016, 93-5; Han 2018, 57; Lei 2017, 112; Qiang 2010, 207). In fact, Shirk
states that the goal of the government is actually to have “politically compliant” Internet
providers self-censor their content (2010, 15).
Recent Developments and the Effects of Censorship
Some scholars note that Chinese Internet censorship has become increasingly
restrictive under Xi Jinping’s leadership. Strittmatter describes how online expression has
declined under Xi’s rule, writing, “He [Xi Jinping] silenced the internet once more”
(Strittmatter 2020, 33). Similar oversimplifications are reflected in Western media,
demonstrating that these perspectives are also presented to the larger readership of news
media. Economy (2018a) and Reuters (2017) also describe how Chinese Internet
censorship under Xi Jinping has increased, highlighting the detriment these increased
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restrictions have had on Chinese society. The “black and white” perspective presented by
these authors only discusses Chinese Internet censorship in a superficial sense, neglecting
the actual discourse it has prompted at the netizen level.
Despite reports of Xi’s Internet censoring critical conversation, some authors
report that Internet censorship has actually increased online criticism of the government.
Both Han and Yang describe this phenomenon. They argue that increased censorship of
the Internet causes netizens to actively resist said censorship and to be innovative in their
workarounds of discussing or accessing censored material (Han 2018, 103; Yang 2009,
44). Finally, Lei concludes that the correlation between increased online critique and
Internet development could be attributed to the fact that netizens tend to be a more
politically independent group to begin with and are therefore more likely to openly
critique the government (2011, 309-10). This initial independence/non-conformism,
added to the access that the Internet provides, results in a space in which netizens can
relatively openly challenge and critique the failings of the government, even under Xi’s
increased controls (Han 2018, 45; Lei 2017; 32).
Literature Review Conclusion
There are incongruities between Western-centric perspectives and local
experiences in relation to the different narratives of the Chinese Internet, collective
action, self-censorship, and the effects and recent developments of censorship. “Black
and white” literature tends to portray Chinese Internet censorship’s relationship with
democracy, specifically, how it goes against traditional democratic values. While this
narrative is not incorrect, per se, it does not reflect the local or “shades of grey”
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perspective of Chinese Internet censorship, as netizens are generally unconcerned with
how the Chinese Internet affects democratic potential.
III. Analysis
This analysis presents the frameworks that inform the literature on Chinese
Internet censorship, including essentialized views of democracy and the Internet,
Orientalism and authoritarianism, nationalism, and rituals. It discusses the motivations
and rationale of the Chinese government for Internet censorship, as presented by both the
“black and white” and “shades of grey” parties. Lastly, this analysis describes the diverse
actors who participate in Internet censorship.
Frameworks for Understanding Internet Censorship
Internet and Democracy
Western-centric views of the Internet are informed by the notion that the Internet
should serve as a platform for democracy. The democratic value of the Internet is seen as
non-negotiable, as well as being an undeniable and inherent part of Internet usage.
Therefore, many Westerners assume that the Internet must bring democracy along with it,
especially in places that have more restrictions on freedoms or are not democratic (Jiang
2012, 78-9). In fact, the Internet has been attributed as a key factor in several
pro-democracy movements, reinforcing the Western notion that it can be a democratizing
force. For example, the Internet helped democratize Mexico in the 1990s and undermine
the Suharto regime in Indonesia (Jiang 2012, 78). Most notably in recent history, the
Internet and social media played a significant role in a series of pro-democracy protests
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and uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa known as the Arab Spring
(Brown, Guskin, and Mitchell 2012). Although these examples do confirm the
democratizing potential of the Internet, they do not mean that the Internet will prompt
democracy in all cases where the Internet is present but democracy is not. In the case of
China, which has the Internet but not democracy, this failure of the Internet to
democratize prompts much criticism from the West.
Western criticism of China’s Internet partially stems from the fact that it has failed
to democratize China. Several authors specifically note that Western observers were
disappointed with the Internet’s spread in China, as they expected the Internet to
democratize the country (Gang and Bandurski 2010, 60; Guo 2020, 231; Jiang 2012, 5,
78). However, Poell describes this association with the Internet and democracy as a
“fundamental misunderstanding,” articulating that increasing freedom and democracy in
a particular state is much more complicated than having access to the Internet (2010,
191). This misunderstanding stems from the “black and white” perception that the West
has of the Internet, which is informed by essentialized democratic values and often fails
to account for local perspectives. The West uses these democratic values as an ideological
tool to criticize China’s non-democratic government for hindering democratic freedoms
through Internet censorship.
Democratic values consequently imply an opposition to censorship. Censorship is
generally antithetical to the Western-centric notion of freedom, and is therefore an
essential aspect of Western critique of China’s Internet. Western critique of Chinese
Internet censorship is found in both Western scholarship and news media, which are
informed by the same ideals that are so strongly held, they are even expressed by Western
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politicians. The American stance on anti-censorship – which is informed by the U.S.’s
democratic values – can be seen in speeches by American politicians. For example,
shortly following the Arab Spring, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a
statement promising that the U.S. would continue to fight against Internet censorship in
countries such as China (Xu and Albert 2009). This statement is not only a reflection of
Western-centric perceptions of democracy and freedom, but it also reflects the lack of
understanding present in the West of the netizen experience of the Chinese Internet and
Internet censorship. In other words, just because the West would like to see China
become democratized does not mean that Chinese citizens share that same goal or value
of democracy.
“Shades of grey” literature on Internet censorship often more accurately reflects
the netizen experience, as well as their own political goals, which do not extend to
aspirations of democracy. Scholarly writings attending to these local perspectives
oftentimes show that Chinese netizens are in support of their government, at least to an
extent that they do not desire any type of major political change (Guo 2020, 125; Han
2018, 187; Jiang 2020, 63). This is not to say that netizens do not protest or criticize, but
in general, many netizens are relatively satisfied with both their Internet access and
government system. At least, they are satisfied to an extent that they do not wish to revolt
on behalf of democracy (Han 2018, 185). Of course, the fact that Chinese netizens
generally do not care about democracy does not mean that censorship does not still
inhibit their freedom of speech. However, without this understanding of Chinese netizen
values, many Western depictions remain limited in that they do not reflect how netizens
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experience censorship. Western depictions only portray how the West interprets
censorship as affecting netizens from afar.
Local perspectives address netizen values and perceptions of Internet censorship.
Representing the netizen perspective, Han notes that Chinese netizens may genuinely
support the state (and therefore state censorship), and even if they do have grievances
regarding censorship, they are not significant enough to prompt an anti-censorship,
pro-democratic system overhaul (2018, 185). Jiang confirms Han’s former idea, noting
that many Chinese netizens not only support the government, but that they are actually
frustrated with the constant negative Western commentary on their Internet and
government system (2012, 5). These ideas presented by Han and Jiang demonstrate how
the mainstream Western understanding of Chinese Internet censorship and Chinese
authoritarianism is incomplete. Han, Jiang, and other scholars that describe the local
experience are representative of the “shades of grey” perspective, demonstrating that
understanding Chinese Internet censorship is far more complex than simply looking at
how it impacts democracy and freedoms.
Orientalism and Authoritarianism
In addition to Western-centric views of democracy, Orientalism is another
Western phenomenon that affects Western perceptions of China. Said argues that the
concept of Orientalism is important in informing Western perceptions of China in
general. By extension, Orientalism lends some understanding into how the West views
Chinese Internet practices. Edward Said originally introduced the notion of Orientalism,
describing it as a “Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over
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the Orient” (Said 1978, 3).1 For reference, “the Orient” refers to Asia and the Middle
East. While Said focused the specificities of his theory on the Middle East (which was
Orientalized by Western Europe), he also acknowledges that, especially in the American
context, the Orient can refer to the “Far East,” or what is now known as East Asia (Said
1978, 3). Said describes authority as being “virtually indistinguishable from certain ideas
it dignifies as true” (1978, 19-20). In this way, Said is arguing that the West uses
Orientalism to assert both Western dominance over the Orient, and Western ideas over
Oriental ones. Orientalism is a framework that explains how the West imposes their
ideological superiority on others. This ideological superiority entails viewing other
nations through the lens of the West’s own ideologies, including democracy. While this
does not mean that democracy should be characterized in the same way that Orientalism
is (as a negative, biased, judgemental framework), it does mean that democracy can be
used as a tool to assert ideological superiority over others, because it is viewed as being a
superior mode of governance.
Notions of Orientalism and democracy can have a compounding effect in
determining how the West views China. Daniel Vukovich proposes the idea that harsh
Western perceptions of China can be informed by both Orientalism and Western
democratic values. Vukovich attributes much of the harsh Western perceptions of China
to anti-communist, post-Cold War sentiments,2 in addition to Orientalism (2012, xii, 23).
2 Western anti-authoritarian sentiment is not specifically limited to China; it can be seen in Western
perceptions of authoritarian Eastern European nations as well. However, Vukovich argues that this
sentiment in regards to China is compounded by Orientalism, which does not happen with Eastern
European nations.
1 Said actually defines Orientalism in three different ways: The first being as an academic interest, applying
to anyone who teaches about or researches the Orient; the second being based on theoretical distinctions
between the Orient and the Occident; the third being the Western style of dominating the Orient, as
described in the text. While the former two definitions are important, Said argues, the latter is the most
relevant, and what his work Orientalism looks to explore (Said 1978, 1-2).
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In agreement with Said’s observation of a constant Western desire to maintain intellectual
superiority over Asia (1978, 19), Vukovich (2012, xii) describes Western representations
of China as resulting from “positional superiority.” However, Vukovich also notes that
this ostracism stems from Orientalist intellectual tradition, as well as pro-democratic
attitudes; the fact that China is not democratic alienates it further from the West (2012,
xii, 11). Essentially, Vukovich is arguing that China, because it is “Oriental” and
authoritarian, is doubly othered in the West:3
“ … the discourse of anti-communism, and the lynchpin concept of
totalitarianism, are part and parcel of Sinological-orientalism.
‘Oriental-despotism’ became ‘totalitarianism.’ Passive and irrational Chinese
minds were easily ‘brainwashed.’ Orwellian oppression reigned, save for a few
brave and inspiring stories of the human spirit… it should no longer be possible to
speak of orientalism and China without also speaking of capitalism and the
enduring presence of the Cold War, and the specter of the East” (Vukovich 2012,
21, emphasis added).
Vukovich’s analysis incorporates Said’s framework of Orientalism with pro-democratic
sentiments, painting a more comprehensive picture of Western perceptions of China than
either of the former parties do independently. In the case of Western understandings of
the Chinese Internet, it is important to understand how various theoretical, historical, and
sociological perspectives can all contribute to the West having a consistent and critical
view of Chinese Internet censorship. The “double othering” phenomenon Vukovich
describes is seen in academic work, the media, and popular culture (Vukovich 2012, 11).
3 “Othering” is a term that describes the process of alienating and attributing negative characteristics to
certain groups that differ in some way from the social norm. The West “others” China in Vukovich’s
analysis because China is non-democratic and Oriental, which are considered “non-Western” values (the
West is considered to be both democratic and non-Oriental). Each of these factors individually serve to
“other” China from the West, and when combined, they serve to exponentially alienate China from the
West.
14
Western portrayals of China’s Internet in academia and news media are informed by both
Orientalism and ideologically charged notions of Chinese authoritarianism.
The West has maintained its view of ideological superiority over China
throughout history, according to Said and Vukovich. Controversial ideologies in regards
to China revolve around the Chinese government system. From the vantage point of the
West, China’s non-democratic government system is intrinsically opposed to that of
Western liberal democracies and necessarily implies greater restrictions on general
freedoms, of which the West also disapproves. Pro-democratic disapproval of an
authoritarian nation significantly contributes to Western criticism of Internet censorship.
Said and Vukovich would argue that Orientalism also plays a role in this criticism.
Democracy-informed anti-authoritarianism, along with Orientalism, result in the
straightforward and incomplete view that the West carries about China’s Internet.
Consequently, both Western scholarship and Western media tend to present
oversimplified narratives of Chinese Internet censorship due to these frameworks.
Orientalism is perceived as a negative framework for understanding Chinese
Internet censorship while democracy is not. However, they are both utilized as
frameworks by “black and white” scholars to assert Western ideological superiority. The
difference between democracy and Orientalism is that democracy itself is neither
“positive” or “negative” (this is not to say that its connotation is not qualified one way or
another), whereas Orientalism is characterized as being “negative.” As a framework,
Orientalism is a critique of how the West views and treats the Orient; Said describes
Orientalism as a negative Western framework that is both manufactured and minimizing.
Both democracy and Orientalism, however, are ideologies that inform the Western
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perspective. Western literature uses democracy to reduce the importance of local
experiences by overemphasizing China’s non-democratic practices in relation to Western
values. Orientalism furthers the Western notion of ideological superiority that allows the
West to justify minimizing local experiences in the name of appraising the moral
standards of Chinese Internet practices. Eventually, both of these frameworks compound
in some Western scholarship and most Western media reporting on China’s Internet
censorship, resulting in narratives that oversimplify the experiences of Chinese netizens
in favor of delineating the oppressive aspects of Internet censorship.
Nationalism
Perceptions of Chinese nationalism can be divided into two groups: the first being
authors who describe nationalism as a result of state censorship and who rely heavily on
the Western-centric democratic and Orientalist frameworks described above, and the
second being authors who represent netizen actors who accept censorship because they
support the state. “Black and white” literature attributes state censorship as a primary
factor behind constructing Chinese nationalism, describing how censorship and
propaganda have served to alter online discourse in favor of the state. Some examples
include the promotion of an online app, Xuexi Qiangguo (学习强国),4 meant to promote
CCP ideology, and hiring a “fifty-cent army” to post CCP propaganda online (members
of the fifty-cent army were supposedly paid fifty cents per post) (Huang 2019; Han 2018,
115-7). Economy (2018b, 40-3) and Strittmatter (2020, 8, 52-3) both argue that the
4 Xuexi Qiangguo can be translated in different ways, including “study the great nation,” “study to
strengthen the nation,” and “study Xi (as in Xi Jinping) to strengthen the nation.”
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Chinese government censors the Internet to promote nationalist agendas, thus inspiring
loyalty and patriotism among Chinese citizens. Strittmatter specifically writes, “Of all the
ways to unite the nation, nationalism is the cheapest” (2020, 8). In this passage,
Strittmatter describes how the CCP promotes nationalism as a way to garner support from
the people. He goes on to stipulate that this Chinese nationalism is a threat to Western
democracy (Strittmatter 2020, 9). The relationship between Chinese nationalism,
censorship, and Western democracy is of particular import to the West because they view
Chinese nationalism as resulting from state manipulation (censorship), therefore creating
a patriotism that is in support of a non-democratic state. However, others would argue
that Chinese nationalism has deeper roots than state propaganda, which can be seen in its
relationship to the Internet.
The Internet has created a market for nationalistic products. These products can
include anything from songs, to video games, to Chinese-made products (Jiang 2012, 60).
Jiang acknowledges the argument that it is possible these nationalistic products appeared
as a result of government influence, however, she notes that this would not explain their
widespread popularity (2012, 60). According to Jiang, the popularity of these products
can be attributed to the patriotism that is now present in many aspects of daily life,
especially among the younger generations (2012, 60). Consuming these products, or
consuming nationalism, in turn, inspires more nationalism, and thus a cyclical
relationship is formed, embedding nationalism into Chinese Internet and consumer
culture as both something that is consumed as well as produced. While the Internet aids
in furthering nationalistic sentiments, their origin lies in China’s history.
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Authors writing from a “shades of grey” perspective describe how nationalism
results from local attitudes and Chinese history, and how it affects netizen opinions on
censorship. Jiang describes this local nationalism as the “Chinese bottom-up” approach to
understanding Chinese nationalism (2012, 56-7). This approach describes Chinese
citizens as viewing nationalism as something produced directly by Chinese citizens and
as something citizens contribute to their society (Jiang 2012, 56). Nationalism is
perceived as being relatively objective, as the people themselves influence its meaning
and development (Jiang 2012, 57). Chinese nationalism is also the result of historical
contexts, according to Jiang. Jiang argues that Chinese nationalism developed
significantly as a result of past relationships with Japan, the U.S., and the USSR, all of
which prompted China to become less reliant on other nations, and strong enough to
defend itself. Today, Chinese nationalism remains very strong, in part because it is
something that has grown with, and in, Chinese culture in recent history. Local-based
nationalism, like Jiang describes, contributes to how Chinese netizens view censorship.
General support for the CCP, and therefore China, entails relative support for censorship
if that is what is required for Internet access. Lastly, local perspectives indicate that
online censorship is primarily focused on preventing collective action, rather than
hindering the everyday conversations of netizens.
Rituals
The sociological framework of rituals informs literature on state censorship,
despite some authors representing the ritual of censorship in a negative light and others
arguing for more nuanced interpretations. Traditionally, rituals described an activity,
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usually one with social, religious, or historical significance, involving the collective
participation of a group or community to sanctify some object or phenomenon, that
produced a shared emotional sentiment. Generally, rituals are prompted by powerful
actors with the goal of creating a shared reality (Savelsberg 2021, 117). According to
Savelsberg, rituals have taken on a more wide-ranging definition in the modern day: “ …
rituals take place in all spheres of life, while that which they sanctify varies” (2021, 114).
Jiang draws on the modern adaptation of rituals; in her view, censorship sanctifies “truth”
in public discourse. Rituals become a useful framework for understanding narratives of
censorship because authors such as Jiang equate the process and outcome of rituals to be
the same censorship. Both can be initiated by powerful actors, including the government,
and as rituals create shared understandings, censorship creates common truths.
The “black and white” body of literature often emphasizes how the ritual of
censorship is used by the government to control its citizens. Specifically, “black and
white” authors describe how censorship acts as a government-enacted truth-creating ritual
that serves only to repress the population. Strittmatter accredits censorship, or
“conquer[ing] the word” as paramount to maintaining autocratic power (2020, 20).
Economy also describes the perceived importance of censorship in subduing the dangers
of unchecked information in order to maintain control (2018b, 72-3). Both authors
portray censorship as a government ritual enacted solely to control the population by
means of information control and creating specific narratives of truth and reality. While
the fundamental purpose of censorship is to produce a widely accepted truth, other
authors argue that censorship and truth have a more complicated relationship.
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Authors who seek to describe the local experience of censorship outline the
outcomes of common thought and shared understandings. For instance, Jiang argues that
censorship can positively affect the construction of knowledge (2012, 69). Jiang describes
how censorship can produce a united narrative or shared understanding of reality that
connects subjects to each other, as well as their society’s established values. In
referencing Foucault, Jiang writes that censorship “produces reality… and truth” (2012,
69), and specifies that this production is not necessarily negative. According to Jiang,
censorship (and its creation of shared truths) can be distinguished from repression, and its
effects are not always negative; she contends that the result of censorship – the formation
of common understandings across a population – can have the effect of uniting a
population, which she views as a positive outcome. Jiang’s proposition that censorship
can have positive effects is important, especially because “censorship” generally holds an
exclusively negative connotation. The framework that Jiang views censorship through
focuses on analyzing how it affects knowledge, rather than assessing whether censorship
itself is positive or negative (she argues that censorship’s effects can be positive, not that
censorship itself is). Although Jiang proposes that censorship can have arguably positive
effects, she nonetheless acknowledges that censorship is usually associated with its more
negative results (2012, 68-70). The “shades of grey” perspective Jiang presents serves to
simply demonstrate that the truth-production ritual of censorship is more complicated
than being wholly repressive, as other authors would suggest. The framework of rituals is
helpful in understanding how authors describe censorship, as well as useful in
understanding why the Chinese government focuses its censorship on collective action.
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In addition to rituals being a framework for understanding how censorship creates
shared truths, rituals can also refer to how public events are used to create shared
experiences, some of which become the focus for government censorship. Sociologist
Francesca Polletta describes how citizens all over the world have a history of taking a
traditional public ritual, such as a holiday, commemoration, or festival, and turning it into
a platform for protest (2004, 152). Public rituals or events serve the same purpose as
censorship in the ritual sense, in that they are both initiated by powerful actors with the
intent of creating a shared experience or understanding. Polletta also notes that
challengers to the government have a limited scope depending on the political contexts in
which they are operating (Polletta 2004, 152). In the case of China, because of the
Tiananmen Square Incident and its aftermath – the appropriation of other political
anniversaries and public events by the public for protest – the Chinese government now
responds much more harshly to collective action events, according to Polletta (2004,
161). Even so, the Chinese government’s relationship with protests and other collective
action events are further complicated by other historical and cultural considerations.
Besides Tiananmen Square, China has a lengthy history with protests that affect
how the CCP responds to collective action today. Yang observes China’s lengthy history
of protest, noting that protesting is actually a foundational aspect of Chinese political
culture (2009, 67). Historically, the government has allowed small demonstrations from
laborers and farmers because they were not perceived as a significant threat to the
regime. On the other hand, China has had no tolerance for allowing protests from the
religious group Falun Gong because past experience has indicated that other religious
rebellions can result in forceful leadership changes (Polletta 2004, 159; Yang 2009, 67).
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Furthermore, Yang describes how citizens would often plan protests on historically or
culturally significant days, writing, “Protests often gained power through the
appropriation of state rituals” (2009, 68). In protesting during state rituals, such as
holidays, citizens’ protests were often legitimated by acknowledgment from state leaders.
Yang also gives an example of when protesters have appropriated a state ritual: In 1999,
Chinese students protested against a Chinese embassy bombing in Belgrade shortly
following May fourth, which is an important anniversary for the CCP. Past protests and
appropriation of state rituals often took place physically, whereas currently, collective
action tends to take place in the online sphere.
The transference of protests to the online sphere entails a more nuanced
relationship between the state, collective action, and censorship. Although protesters used
to occupy physical spaces to draw attention (Polletta 2004, 158-9), they are now able to
use the Internet to reach an even wider audience. Currently, the Internet’s potential for
collective action is quite substantial, considering that the number of Chinese netizens
currently sits around 854 million (Johnson 2021b). As the Internet’s reach is so
expansive, authors note that it has become increasingly common for the Internet to be
used as a platform for protest or activism (Han 2018, 4; Yang 2009, 4). Even the
previously-mentioned appropriation of state rituals has made its way online. Yang also
describes how netizens have appropriated the state ritual of sloganeering (where the
government would poster or paint short, catchy slogans to convey a certain message)
(2009, 70). Instead of physically painting slogans on walls, netizens post similarly-styled
slogans on online message boards, but to convey their own dissenting or critical message.
Currently, the Internet provides a space for netizens to virtually protest. However, due to
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the CCP’s history with collective action against the government, large-scale online
protests are the most likely to be censored.
Rationale for Internet censorship
Collective Action
Authors describing Chinese Internet censorship from a “black and white”
perspective often focus their arguments on the censoring of dissenting voices, rather than
the goal of primarily censoring collective action. For example, Economy (2018a)
describes the CCP as “silence[ing] dissenting voices, ” and Strittmatter describes
censorship as being specifically aimed toward every individual (2020, 89). The fact that
this notion of mass censorship against all individual voices is present in both Western
media (Economy 2018a) and more scholarly works (Strittmatter 2020) indicates either an
oversimplification or misunderstanding of how Chinese Internet censorship works in
actuality. Looking at the approach the CCP takes in Internet censorship, one can see that
generally censoring dissenting voices is not a primary goal. Instead, the goal of Chinese
Internet censorship is to censor online narratives with the potential for collective action.
Chinese Internet censorship is focused on preventing collective action, rather than
individual dissenting voices. Several authors argue that the primary purpose of Internet
censorship is to subdue collective action, or otherwise suppress any movement that could
result in physical gatherings with the possibility to be disruptive or destructive (Guo
2020, 128; King, Pan, and Roberts 2013 1-2; Lei 2017, 142-5; Shirk 2010, 3; Qiang
2010, 2009; Xu and Albert 2009). As collective action is the primary focus of Internet
censorship, individual criticism without the potential for collective action is generally
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permitted, contrary to the indications of the authors in the previous paragraph. These
authors present censorship as “black and white,” in a very all-encompassing,
uncomplicated manner. In fact, several authors note that the Chinese Internet actually
houses many critical voices (Guo 2010, 123; Han 2018, 4; Jiang 2012, 75; Qin,
Strömberg, and Wu 2017, 127). Furthermore, “shades of grey” authors contend that the
CCP not only does not censor all dissenting voices, but that it would be nearly impossible
for them to censor all online criticism, even if they wanted to (Lei 2017, 32). The “shades
of grey” body of literature lends perspective to the actual goals and practices of the
CCP’s Internet censorship, which is to censor events with collective action potential
(King, Pan, and Roberts 2013, 6), which Lei also labels as “public opinion incidents” or
“contentious experiences” (2017, 142-5, 163). These public opinion incidents or
collective action events are generally related to local political issues, rather than
grievances against the central government (Lei 2017, 143). However, in some cases,
where the potential for social unrest is high, events that are unrelated to the central
government or local politics can be censored, which the following case studies describe.
Case Studies of Censoring Collective Action
One incident of a censored collective action event was the anti-Japanese protests
in 2005. During a time of tension between Japan and China in early 2005, Chinese
citizens used the Internet to communicate about several Japan-related events, which they
felt were generally disrespectful. These events included government approval of new
history textbooks (in Japan) that arguably diminished the severity of Japanese war crimes
and the Japanese Prime Minister visiting a memorial for Japanese war heroes, some of
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whom committed war crimes (Stockmann 2010, 175). The protests against Japan soon
became physically destructive and disruptive, and resulted in destruction and
vandalization of both public and private property. The government responded by
censoring online information and discussion about these Japanese events, in order to
quell the outrage. As a result, the protests quickly subsided (Stockmann 2010, 183-5).
Likely, the goal of this censorship was to prevent the further destruction of property and
public disorder. Although the protesters were not protesting against the Chinese
government at any level (local or central), and were not protesting a political event
happening in China, online discussions resulting in these protests were still censored.
This indicates the underlying motive of the Chinese government to censor events both
with collective action potential, as well as the potential to be disruptive or destructive.
Collective action censorship applies to events even if they are not intended to be action
against the government. The case of censoring anti-Japanese protests also presents an
inconsistency with the “black and white” notion that the CCP is primarily focused on
censoring critical online voices. The next example describes how the CCP also censors
online discussion of collective action events that are not political in nature, or involve
protesting.
This example of the CCP censoring collective action stems from a non-critical,
non-political event following the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear disaster. In 2011, the
Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Fukushima, Japan, experienced nuclear
meltdowns and chemical explosions following an earthquake and subsequent tsunami,
causing concern of radiation poisoning and contamination, especially in neighboring
regions. One country that became particularly concerned about the threat of radiation was
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China. Following news of the plant breakdown, a rumor started that there were properties
in salt that would protect from radiation. One rumor, in the Zhejiang province of China,
prompted many people to rush to buy salt all across Zhejiang province. The Chinese
government responded by censoring local (near Zhejiang and surrounding regions) online
traffic to prevent rushes on supermarkets and other disorderly behavior (King, Pan, and
Roberts 2013, 17). King, Pan, and Roberts’s study on collective action censorship in
China listed this particular incident as being one of the most highly censored events out
of all of the events they studied, despite the fact that it was completely apolitical in nature
(2013, 17). Their study of events’ “collective action potential” determined, as seen in the
example above, that sometimes even non-political events can still become the target of
heavy censorship, when they have the potential to physically mobilize the population.
Like the previous example, the censorship of the post-Fukushima salt rush indicates that
the CCP has other censorship goals besides simply repressing all critical voices. These
two examples serve to indicate that the Chinese government focuses more on censoring
events with collective action potential, including the potential to be detrimental (as in
causing salt shortages in supermarkets) or destructive (causing property damage), above
other online chatter. They emphasize the importance of analyzing aspects of censorship
from a local, “shades of grey” perspective, rather than simply looking at it in “black and
white,” which tends to portray censorship as censoring critical voices, rather than
censoring potentially disruptive collective action events. Similar to how the “black and
white” perspective tends to overlook the goal of censoring collective action, they also
often misrepresent the CCP’s censorship mechanisms, including the notion of
self-censorship.
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Actors of Internet Censorship
Self-censorship
Diverse actors, including both Chinese and international/Western corporations, all
self-censor in order to access the Chinese market. Self-censorship – the idea that
independent corporations censor content on their own platforms, instead of the
government censor their platforms directly – allows the CCP to outsource Internet
censorship duties to independent companies in exchange for permitting them to operate in
China. Currently, Internet service and content providers in China must either be licensed
or registered to operate (Creemers 2016, 93). Companies who host the largest online
platforms in China also must meet licensing requirements to continue access the Chinese
market. Examples of these companies include Sina – which runs Weibo – or Tencent –
which hosts WeChat, the most popular messaging app in China (Ruan, Knockel, and
Crete-Nishihata 2020). These licensing requirements enable the government to influence
online discussions without directly censoring the Internet. Some authors disagree on
whether or not the mandate to self-censor is officially enforced or an unsaid requirement,
but most authors agree that self-censorship happens regardless (Bamman, O’Connor, and
Smith 2012; Creemers 2016, 92-3; Han 2018, 57-8; Poell 2015, 193). Noting the
disagreements in current literature on the topic of mandated self-censorship reveals the
inconsistencies that exist in reporting on Chinese censorship. These discrepancies further
reinforce the value of the “shades of grey” body of literature in that they illustrate the
complexities of studying the Chinese Internet. In addition, they highlight the importance
of looking at Internet censorship from a local perspective in order to garner a more
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accurate understanding of how it works. Furthermore, the fact that there are discrepancies
indicates that the oversimplified narrative that “black and white” literature presents
cannot possibly account for the various components and differing experiences of Chinese
Internet censorship. There are also other disparities in the literature regarding the actual
censorship capabilities of self-censorship, indicating that a “black and white” narrative
that seeks to place concrete, blanket determinations on censorship is likely
oversimplifying.
There is disagreement in the current literature about the thoroughness of
self-censorship, the primary method for Internet censorship currently employed in China.
Some authors argue that the Chinese censorship system is very well developed and works
with great effectiveness and efficiency (Economy 2018a; Strittmatter 2020, 61, 70-6, 82).
By “effective” and “efficient,” these authors intend to describe a censorship system that is
capable of censoring the larger Chinese Internet quickly and comprehensively.
Strittmatter provides examples of how the government quickly shut down activists’
Weibo accounts (2020, 70) and censored the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement into
extinction (2020, 73) as proof of the effectiveness and efficiency of Chinese censorship.
Note that these two sources, Economy and Strittmatter, are two Western-based reporters
(Economy is also a foreign policy advisor, focusing on the relationship the U.S. has with
China). Despite both being experts in their particular fields of work and study in relation
to China, their reporting tends to reflect more American values, and seeks to place
judgement on Chinese government policies and actions, which may explain their
interpretation of the Chinese censorship system. Their literature reflects a possible bias in
that, compared to other scholars, they tend to sensationalize Chinese authoritarianism and
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other critical features of China’s government system in opposition to Western-centric
values. This narrative of all-encompassing censorship is one that is contradicted by other
scholars. In fact, both Guo (2020, 1-2) and Han (2018, 1-2) acknowledge in their own
writings the existence of incongruent narratives on the complete capabilities of Chinese
Internet censorship. While the “black and white” party presents one narrative – that of
Chinese censorship being entirely comprehensive in its ability to censor – the other party
finds China’s censorship system to be less complete, in part due to the government’s
reliance on self-censorship.
Scholars who find the Chinese censorship system to be less thorough have come
to this conclusion based on how fractured the system is. Authors note that Internet
censorship has become increasingly fragmented (Bamman, O’Connor, and Smith 2012;
Yang 2009, 28), and that this fragmentation can be attributed to the fact that there are too
many agencies and players involved in censorship (Lei 2017, 175). Having too many
actors involved in the censorship process results in poorly organized division of labor and
responsibilities (Lei 2017, 175). The “shades of grey” side of this debate also argues that
placing the responsibility on private companies to self-censor their content has also
resulted in a less effective censorship system (Shirk 2010, 1). Several authors describe
how Internet censorship is often undermined (Han 2018, 45; Xu and Albert 2009), and
how sometimes “censored” information is still available after it has supposedly been
removed (Qin, Strömberg, and Wu 2017, 123). These opposing viewpoints illustrate the
misconceptions that surround China’s censorship system, especially when taking into
account the political and cultural background of certain perspectives. Furthermore, these
disparities emphasize the importance of supplementing Western news media reports and
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other “black and white” literature on China with “shades of grey” literature, or literature
that acknowledges the complexities of Internet censorship. Literature or news media that
insists on portraying Chinese Internet censorship as simply being a well-oiled machine
with the ability to comprehensively censor an entire nation is generally leaving out part of
the picture, hence the importance of more thorough sources. These “shades of grey”
sources also present self-censorship from a local perspective, illuminating the goals of the
CCP behind encouraging self-censorship.
The CCP’s perspective is that self-censorship is the most efficient way to censor
the online sphere, thus censorship energies are predominately focused on encouraging
self-censorship. Self-censorship allows the Chinese government to outsource its
censorship standards to independent companies. Corporations that operate online sites are
required by the state to regulate the information and discussions happening on their
platforms (Creemers 2016, 93-5; Qiang 2010, 207; Yang 2009, 50). The goal of
self-censorship is maximizing efficiency and prompting preemptive, proactive
compliance with censorship guidelines, which is possible because independent companies
are aware of all of their users, enabling them to track all the information being relayed on
their platforms directly (Han 2018, 59). Han (2018, 59) and Shirk (2010, 1) both suggest
that requiring censorship from third party suppliers of Internet services saves on both
time and financial resources when it comes to regulating information. In fact, Shirk
(2020, 1) also describes how placing the responsibility of content regulation on
independent third parties significantly contributed to the development of both the Chinese
Internet and economy. Allowing Internet content providers to independently create their
own censorship infrastructure introduced an aspect of autonomy and willing compliance
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with these platforms.  Jiang describes the phenomenon of achieving voluntary
compliance of Internet content and service providers as being “free yet governable”
(2012, 42). While the Internet and social media companies are technically free, it is in
their best interest to regulate themselves, and they do so. This makes them “governable.”
Although self-censorship is done independently and proactively, and is in the best interest
of Internet platforms, (it reduces the threat of sanctions and licensing revocation) this
does not mean that it is enthusiastically voluntary.
One common misconception about self-censorship by companies is that they are
nothing but willing to restrict their users’ speech. Some scholars argue that many
companies would prefer not to censor their platform, but have no other choice (Han 2018,
59). Han also claims that many Internet companies may not genuinely support
censorship, but they cannot afford to flout the rules, as this would result in significant
fees (2018, 64-5). Essentially, the argument Han presents is that the decision to
self-censor comes down to the choice of being allowed to operate in China or not, which,
for many Chinese-based companies, is not even a choice. The importance of Han’s
contribution on the willingness of companies to censor is that it reflects a “shades of
grey,” local approach to Internet censorship. As Han describes how some companies
would rather avoid self-censorship, he is presenting a more nuanced perspective of
censorship that paints it as something that is interacted with differently at all levels of its
implementation. This interaction of online platforms with self-censorship includes being
less willing to self-censor, as well as delaying self-censorship on their platforms as a
result of this.
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Given how the Chinese censorship system is set up, intermediary actors such as
Internet content providers or online platforms, do not always censor their users
immediately. This delay is done for a variety of reasons. First, as previously mentioned,
many companies simply disagree with censoring their platforms. Han posits that
self-censorship is contradictory to their company values, and can impede on the
profitability of these independent services (2018, 60). Han coined the term “low profile
resistance” to describe how the Internet and social media companies subtly subvert
censorship guidelines (2018, 60). “Low profile resistance” is essentially synonymous
with noncompliance, or at least delayed compliance. Some examples of this delayed
compliance might be taking longer to integrate new censors into their platforms or
temporarily ignoring content that violates censorship regulations. Guo also argues that
some companies keep up their noncompliant content for market reasons (2020, 160).
Netizens tend to be intrigued by postings with taboo topics, so social media or news
websites will occasionally leave a headline or article posted to their site even though it is
not compliant with censorship guidelines in order to generate more Internet traffic.
The examples scholars present of company non-compliance or delayed
compliance expose some of the contradictions that the Chinese Internet and censorship
system prompts. Scholars argue that self-censorship is mandated by the government.
However, these companies only self-censor because it is mandated, and they do not want
to face repercussions from the government for failing to comply. Companies can have
ethical and economical objections to self-censorship, which makes them less willing to
comply. Furthermore, since the censorship enforcement system in China is inconsistent,
companies have some leeway in how and when they comply with censorship guidelines,
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leading to varying degrees of noncompliance. China’s censorship regulations also make it
difficult for international companies to navigate accessing their market. With that being
said, despite the inherent contradictions that censorship poses to Western-centric values
such as freedom, various Western companies have been willing to adopt self-censorship
practices in their services in order to sell in China.
While many Western companies have been banned from operating in China,
others have actually taken steps to make their products CCP-compliant. Companies such
as Facebook and Twitter are not allowed to operate in China as they are unwilling and/or
unable to comply with censorship regulations (Leskin 2019). As the Chinese censorship
infrastructure primarily relies on independent companies censorship themselves,
companies unwilling to do that cannot offer their products to the Chinese market.
Companies that are willing to make adjustments, however, include Apple and Microsoft,
the latter of which has altered its search engine, Bing, to self-censor in the way that
Chinese companies do (Meisenzahl 2019). In addition, Google was also rumored to have
started developing a search engine specifically for Chinese consumers, entitled “Project
Dragonfly,” that would be entirely compliant with Chinese censorship regulations
(Meisenzahl 2019; Simonite 2019). These examples are given to demonstrate that
self-censorship is not something that only Chinese companies, but also American
companies, engage in. Many companies – both Chinese and Western – are willing to put
aside their morals in order to access the Chinese market.
The Chinese market represents an expansive earning opportunity for both national
companies and ones operating from abroad. Currently, it is estimated that more than 62
percent of the Chinese population is on the Internet, meaning that Internet-based
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companies have the potential market of almost a billion people (Johnson 2020a). This
means that many companies still attempt to access the Chinese market, despite any
potential moral conflicts that could arise by complying with Chinese policies. As can be
seen by the previous examples, American companies with the capability to integrate
content regulations into their platforms and services often do so (Economy 2018a). They
do this despite the fact that complying with government imposed censorship regulations
is inherently oppositional to American values because, in truth, most companies tend to
care more about profit than upholding values. This conflict between values and practice
also exists among Chinese companies, as previously mentioned (Han 2018, 64).
Regardless of how Internet companies view censorship, they still impose censorship on
their platforms to meet government requirements.
American reactions to American companies operating in China are especially
telling in determining Western-centric values and how those contribute to other
misconceptions about the Chinese Internet system. The disapproval that is usually applied
to Chinese companies self-censoring is immediately amplified when American
companies also choose to partake. This is likely because Chinese companies complying
with Chinese censorship guidelines is justifiable, albeit distasteful in the Western eye.
However, American or Western companies compromising Western-centric values of
freedom for market gain is considered more unacceptable. Eventually, American
companies must choose whether to comply with censorship guidelines and access the
Chinese market, or to appease their Western base and stay out of China. Google’s
“Project Dragonfly” was actually shut down as a result of backlash from the public
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(Meisenzahl 2019), demonstrating that even a tech giant as influential as Google can still
get caught in the web of international relations and pro-democratic posturing.
Finally, participation in self-censorship, while being necessary to access the
Chinese market, is represented differently, depending on the perspective through which it
is perceived. For example, much Western literature still interprets these independent
companies as being more willing to censor (Han 2018, 182), despite the fact that Western
companies must also comply with censorship guidelines to operate in China. The
essentialized democratic values of some Western authors can be seen in their judgment of
Chinese self-censorship, and indicate a more myopic interpretation of Chinese Internet
censorship. In part, this can be attributed to the fallacy that economic liberalization
implies political liberalization, which seems to be paramount in the Western
understanding of Chinese Internet practices (Lei 2017, 104). Although the Chinese
economy has taken on aspects of capitalism, or economic liberalization, this does not
necessarily mean that China has adopted other Western-centric values such as democracy
(political liberalization). Therefore, despite existing within a freer market, private
companies are still subject to more authoritarian policies such as self-censorship, which is
contradictory to Western norms, hence their harsh interpretation of companies that
“choose” to partake. Here, the “shades of grey” body of literature helps reveal the
contradictions that exist between actual censorship implementation and netizen
experience, and how it is represented in Western media. The points made by authors such
as Han (2018) and Lei (2017) indicate that compliance with censorship regulation is less
about values (like democracy) and more about profit. This dichotomy applies to both
Chinese and Western companies.
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How Censorship Affects Chinese Civil Society
Western-centric discourse on Chinese Internet censorship focuses on the
suppression of free speech and obscures the critical processes developed by netizens to
subvert censorship. Authors whose work falls under the “black and white” body of
literature paint censorship as being repressive, completely disallowing any type of critical
thought or action. Strittmatter describes censorship as creating “slavish subservience”
among the Chinese people (2020, 244), indicating that censorship creates a population of
netizens that is unable and unwilling to think critically about censorship, or respond to
censorship in a creative way. “Black and white” literature’s essentializing approach to
addressing Internet censorship,as something that is exclusively and entirely repressive, is
mutually reaffirmed in Western news media. For example, Journalist Kiyo Dörrer writes
articles titled, “Hello, Big Brother: How China controls its citizens through social
media,” and depicts Chinese citizens as living in an “Orwellian reality” in which every
aspect of their life is monitored and controlled through technology (2017). These
examples simply serve to exemplify how the “black and white” approach to representing
Chinese Internet censorship can result in an oversimplified perspective. This is especially
relevant as other works in the “shades of grey” body of literature indicate that censorship
is not entirely repressive, and actually prompts critical thinking and activism among
netizens.
Mainstream western perception of Chinese Internet censorship remains shallow
and uncomplicated, as it is unable to see past the hurdle of non-democracy, causing it to
disregard other developments and local experiences of the Chinese Internet. Gang and
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Bandurski yet again reiterate this perspective, arguing that because of their biases,
Western Internet activists can only see the negative aspects of the Chinese Internet and
often overlook the contributions that the Internet has made, despite its censorship, to
Chinese society (2010, 60). According to Jiang, Western media depicts the Chinese
government as a “powerful monster,” which Jiang attributes to the label
(“authoritarian-liberal”) that is placed on it (2012, 75, 78). Vukovich also describes
Western characterizations of the CCP as an “anachronistic” and “evil” institution, holding
China back from joining the democratized world (2012, 3-4). Jiang argues that the
“authoritarian” label is why the West is especially concerned with the freedoms of
Chinese netizens, and citizens in general, and why the West views Internet censorship as
the critical impediment on the advancement of democracy (Jiang 2012, 75, 78). In fact,
Western media and “black and white” literature often reflects this desire that the Internet
will prompt a pro-democratic change, which is why, when it does/has not inspired this
change, these groups revert to blaming the Chinese government and Internet censorship
regulations for restricting democracy and freedom.
Conceptions of democracy and freedom inform both the “black and white” and
“shades of grey” perspectives on Chinese Internet censorship, depending on whether they
are framed as being the ultimate goals of the Internet, or desires of Chinese netizens.
Whereas the “black and white” body of literature, as aforementioned, desires the Internet
to bring about democratic change in China, this is not the desire of most Chinese
netizens. Addressing this point, Jiang concludes that, “China is as liberal as everyone
wants” (2012, 114). Jiang’s quote reveals how censorship and the Internet are viewed
from a local perspective, where netizens are not as concerned about the democratic
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potential of the Internet as Western observers are. Looking at Internet censorship from the
local level often reveals that netizens experience online censorship much differently than
how it is portrayed by the West.
The ways in which Internet culture has developed and grown in response to and in
spite of,government censorship demonstrate the resiliency of the Chinese netizens. While
censorship does impinge on free speech and expression, netizens have managed to turn
Internet censorship into an impetus for development. Netizens have been prompted to be
more independent, find different platforms and modes of activism, creatively market
content, and raise awareness of the extent and effect of the government’s meddling.
Unfortunately, these developments are not seen as being as significant from the
Western-centric perspective, as this perspective emphasizes the democratic potential of
the Internet. Therefore, despite the various developments that have spawned as a result of
the Internet, “black and white” literature does not view them as being substantial
replacements for the development of democracy. To rebut this notion, Gang and Badurski
state, “These changes cannot be understood purely through the prism of Western
democratic desires” (2010, 60). Their quote epitomizes the West’s priorities for China’s
Internet. Western society is so concerned with the democratic state of a nation (or
non-democratic, to be precise), that it is generally willing to disregard any developments
that do not advance a democratic state.
One of the most significant ways censorship has altered Chinese society is how it
changed the activist culture. Most notably, most activism now mostly occurs online and
in a more passive form. Before the mass expansion of the Internet, activism and protests
took place physically and on a large scale. The latter type of activism is described as
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“grand-scale activism” by Guo, who epitomizes this form of activism with the 1989
Tiananmen Square protest (2020, 125). In general, current-day activism on the Chinese
Internet is much more subtle and places an emphasis on political performativity,5
according to scholars (Guo 2020, 126, 157; Han 2018, 78; Yang 2009, 85). Along with
the scale of activism, scholarship indicates the focus of activism has shifted as well.
Instead of working with the goal of large-scale political change, the goal of activism is
now to facilitate smaller change and resolve “immediate social problems” (Guo 2020,
125). Both the more subtle, performative mode of activism, as well as the change in its
overall objective were a result of censorship and netizens adjusting their style to navigate
around the censors. As a result of online censorship, netizens activism has become more
innovative.
Netizens are required to be more creative in their activism – and online posting in
general – in order to subvert the censors. Examples of this creativity include netizens
using homonyms and homophones (the Chinese language is full of them) to confuse
censors, omitting or replacing certain characters in a phrase, or using common
euphemisms (Han 2018, 86). Han (2018, 4, 8) and Yang (2009, 86) attribute the political
climate and mandated censorship as contributing to developing these inventive tactics.
“Creative,” “innovative,” and “artful” are all words used to describe the new techniques
of netizens to avoid censors (Han 2018, 4, 8). Han even dubbed the term “pop activism”
to describe the new type of online activism that seeks to utilize these creative, innovative,
5 There have been a few exceptions to this new passive form of protest, most notably the anti-Japanese
protests that occurred in the early 2000s which turned destructive and violent. The physical ramifications of
these protests prompted the CCP to mandate censorship to quell all online discussion surrounding Japan in
an effort to stop the protests (Stockmann 2010, 183-5). Seeing as how protests that turn physical get shut
down quite quickly, many netizens protest online, where they have more leeway for expression.
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artful techniques to prompt conversation. Pop activism has arisen as a result of the
political climate on the Internet, especially censorship. It relies on “innovative tactics of
expression” (Han 2018, 78), which include performative and expressive tools to discuss
politics. Han also labeled it “pop” activism because of its popular usage. Widespread
engagement is a key component of pop activism; it allows many actors to utilize similar
tools for expression despite having different agendas. Significantly, Han attributes the rise
of pop activism to the muddying of boundaries between politics and online culture (Han
2018, 78). Other authors have also noticed this integration of politics into the Internet,
particularly because of how much China’s politics affect its Internet.
Chinese Internet censorship guidelines resulted in the Internet developing a
political connotation. This phenomenon can be seen in how netizens respond to, and
interact with, censorship. Qiang argues that censorship provokes resentment among
netizens, who then use the Internet as a platform to criticize the government on (2010,
210). The relationship that is formed between netizens and the government is along the
lines of: as government censorship defines the Internet, the Internet accordingly defines
the government. Defining the government, in this case refers to “the CCP’s dominance
[is] being exposed, ridiculed, and criticized, often in the form of political satire, jokes,
songs…” (Qiang 2010, 210). Lei describes this rise of a rebellious, activist, noncompliant
Internet as the development of a contentious public sphere (2017, 33). Lei’s contentious
public sphere is not only developed because of netizens’ response to government
censorship, but it also serves the purpose of forcing the state to acknowledge and engage
with it. The political connotation that censorship entails of the Internet results in netizens
being more critical of not only the government, but also of what the government can
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influence, including information. For this reason, censorship has prompted netizens to be
more critical of the information they find online.
Censorship has created netizens that are more critical of where their information
is sourced from. More and more netizens have started turning to the Internet as an outlet
for information and discussion. Gang and Bandurski note that, as a result of censorship,
netizens increasingly rely on commercial, online sources of news, rather than party media
(2010, 55). Lei even points out how government censorship, especially in state-run
media, caused Chinese readers to be more critical of said media (2017, 105). In fact, strict
government control has resulted in increased distrust of Chinese political institutions (Lei
2017, 105), demonstrating that censorship not only affects Internet culture, but also how
people view larger aspects of Chinese society. Independence is becoming a valued trait;
netizens perceive independent news sources as being more credible, and therefore those
sources fare better economically. Comparatively, independent sources have more freedom
over censoring their own content compared to state-run media. This results in these
independent companies being perceived as a more trustworthy source for news (Qiang
2010,  217). Censorship, in sum, has compelled netizens to turn away from the Party, and
towards the Internet for reliable news. Netizens more heavily rely on the Internet than
non-netizens, and therefore censorship affects netizens more significantly.
Censorship arguably affects Internet culture and netizens more than it does
non-netizens. Netizens have a unique relationship with censorship that non-netizens are
less likely to experience because of their fewer interactions on/with the Internet. Lei
conducted a survey in which she interviewed netizens and non-netizens on several
different aspects of culture. She found that non-netizens were more likely to blame local
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issues for the cause of problems in China. Netizens, on the other hand, blamed a lack of
civil and political rights as a fundamental cause of problems (Lei 2017, 166). Their
perception was likely formed because they experience these injustices more frequently,
through regular usage of the Internet. Similarly, these interviews also found that
comparatively, netizens identified themselves as victims of “the loss of rights'' (Lei 2017,
166). Non-netizens did not share this perspective because Internet censorship is more
obvious and changeable than censorship in other forms, for example print media. With
Internet censorship, netizens can see when censors are activated and when they change.
They notice when their posts are taken down, and how censors hinder their online
activity. Lei’s assertion that netizens are critical actors in their online interactions reflects
how “shades of grey” literature can reveal that censorship is more complicated at the
local level. In addition, netizens’ unique relationship with the Internet can result in them
picking up on certain online censorship behaviors and drawing attention to them.
Censors can serve to increase online activity as a result of the attention drawn to
censorship. When a particular topic or content becomes taboo or censored, this draws
attention to the topic, resulting in increased popularity. In this way, censorship has
changed online culture, especially since the implementation of self-censorship.
Independent companies are mandated to self-censor their content, but because of the
fragmentation of the government’s enforcement system, they have some leeway over how
these censors are enforced. Oftentimes, they use censored content to draw traffic to their
websites. Guo notes how “the removal of online content functions similarly to the
recommendation mechanisms web editors employ to attract user attention,” later
describing how these independent Internet companies work in collaboration with other
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online actors to promote the censored content, thereby popularizing their webpage (2020,
159). Guo also illustrates a similar strategy that web editors use to draw attention to their
page. Web editors occasionally recommend a controversial post, knowing that it is likely
to be censored, and subsequently remove said post (Guo 2020, 160). This strategy leads
netizens to search their site or the Internet for the censored content, consequently
generating traffic and attention. Again, this phenomenon highlights the importance of
analyzing Internet censorship through a local perspective, as it reveals nuances that are
not addressed in more generalizing, black and white reports of online censorship. One
particular benefit of utilizing local experiences to analyze censorship is that it allows for
the inclusion of more specified examples.
One specific example of how censorship can actually increase online attraction to
a specific phenomenon is that of activist and intellectual Han Han. Guo references an
incident in which a young activist and Internet personality named Han Han posted a
political essay on online platform Sina (2020, 159). Shortly after the essay was posted, it
was removed by Sina’s censors. Rather than preventing any further online discussion of
Han Han’s essay, its removal had the opposite intended effect, and resulted in increased
attention to Han Han’s work. Netizens, both curious about the content of Han Han’s essay
and dismayed about its censorship, worked together in a display of activism to
collectively publish various parts of the essay until the complete essay, albeit in parts,
could be found online. Han Han’s censorship, and subsequent netizen response, led to his
essay skyrocketing in popularity. This example contradicts the assumption often found in
“black and white” literature and Western media that censorship only serves to stifle
discussion. Furthermore, this incident demonstrates how censorship can serve to
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popularize content that might otherwise have been relatively uninteresting. In fact, the
netizen response to Han Han’s censorship alludes to the ways in which censorship has
transformed online activism. The effects of censorship on activism, as well as collective
action and self-censorship can be exemplified in one final case study of the impacts of
Coronavirus censorship on netizens.
Case study: Coronavirus Censorship and Western Perceptions
One very recent example of the Chinese government censoring in an attempt to
prevent collective action is the recent outbreak of the Coronavirus. COVID-19 started as
a small viral outbreak in Wuhan, China that quickly spread across the globe. Multiple
aspects of the COVID outbreak are relevant to analyze in terms of Chinese censorship.
This analysis focuses on incidents involving Dr. Li Wenliang, one of the first
whistleblowers about this novel virus. Firstly, it covers censorship regarding the initial
discovery of the Coronavirus, and secondly, it discusses censorship surrounding the
COVID-related death of Dr. Li. Finally, this analysis of COVID censorship is not making
assumptions or judgments about how COVID censorship affected the spread or impact of
the virus. It merely examines how the Chinese government reacted and why.
The first case of censorship surrounding the Coronavirus started around the time
of its initial discovery. Two doctors involved, Dr. Ai Fen and Dr. Li Wenliang posted
messages on WeChat, a popular messaging app, about a new virus. Their posts were
quickly censored by local authorities. In the case of COVID-19, as well as many other
topics in China, censoring is primarily done by independent companies in compliance
with government regulations. After the initial outbreak of COVID-19, social media and
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messaging apps such as YY and WeChat began censoring phrases such as 武汉海鲜市场
(wǔhàn hǎixiān shìchǎng) “Wuhan seafood market,” and phrases including references to
the SARS virus (Crete-Nishihata et al. 2020). One argument as to why China quickly
censored these phrases was because they represented a discussion with collective action
potential, even if that potential was non-political. To draw on a previous example, the
government censored discussion of the post-Fukushima salt rush, partially to prevent the
spread of false rumors, as well as to prevent mass rushes on supermarkets. The collective
action that the government hoped to prevent by initially censoring discussions of the
Coronavirus could very well have been mass panic. Additionally, the CCP could also
have censored COVID content to inhibit the circulation of unverified information. Online
chatter surrounding the Coronavirus started to trend as a result of citizen concern for this
new unknown virus. Much like the post-Fukushima salt rush, this event was not political
and essentially had nothing to do with the Chinese government (at first) (King, Pan, and
Roberts 2013, 17). COVID, like the salt rush, was censored simply because of the
potential for disruption it possessed.
Dr. Li Wenliang’s death prompted another surge of censorship on social media
platforms. Li was one of the first medical professionals to attempt to warn others about
the Coronavirus, and was quickly reprimanded by the government for doing so.
Therefore, when Dr. Li caught COVID and died as a result, public outrage ensued
(Crete-Nishihata et al. 2020). People blamed the government for Li’s death, and he
became a martyr. The general outcry surrounding Dr. Li’s death prompted the CCP/social
media companies to censor conversations or phrases that included his name. CitizenLab,
a research group based out of the University of Toronto, conducted a study on
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Coronavirus censorship and discovered 19 censored keyword combinations referencing
Dr. Li Wenliang. Dr. Li’s name specifically became censored because the public reaction
to his death was political, and directed at the government, unlike other general COVID
keywords or topics that were also censored. More importantly, as Dr. Li’s name was
being censored, the hashtag #wewantfreedomofspeech began trending on a Twitter-like
app called Weibo (Ruan, Knockel, and Crete-Nishihata, 2020).
The initial reaction that netizens had to Dr. Li’s death was a response to not only
his perceived martyrdom, but also the government’s treatment of him during his life and
death. Dr. Li was censored twice by the government. First, when he discovered COVID,
and secondly after he died. Following his death, his name and other keywords relating to
him were censored online (Crete-Nishihata et al. 2020). Guobin Yang argues that “As
power seeks domination, it incurs resistance” (2009, 44), and in this case, that is exactly
what happened. The posthumous censoring of Dr. Li’s name precipitated the netizen
response. In an almost opposing sentiment, Polletta states that, “as challengers innovate,
authorities do too” (2004, 161). As Yang’s quote aptly described the netizen response to
Dr. Li’s death, Polletta’s suits the government’s response to the netizen uprising. In
response to netizens collectively protesting online, the state responded by completely
shutting down and removing any traces of the hashtag surrounding the dissent to prevent
online protesting from turning into physical activism.
Freedom of speech has a complicated history in regards to the Chinese
government, because of the government’s past with free speech movements. As
previously alluded to, the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989 is a major contributing
factor to how the Chinese government handles protests today (Polletta 2004, 161). In this
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case, however, because the hashtag specifically calls for greater freedom of speech,
which was one of the demands of the student protesters at Tiananmen Square, it became a
point of particular concern for the government. The government did not want this call for
freedom of speech to end like the one at Tiananmen Square. Social media companies,
mostly at the behest of the CCP,6 mandated a quick response to this hashtag, as it was
viewed as a challenge to state authority with the potential to mobilize. South China
Morning Post reported that the hashtag #wewantfreedomofspeech was quickly taken
down and eventually disappeared without a trace (Chen 2020). The government’s hasty
response was a reflection of China’s past experiences. Furthermore, their response can be
analyzed through frameworks regarding rituals and truth.
Various theories help analyze both the netizen and government response to Dr.
Li’s death. Specifically, the lens of rituals can be applied to interpret their responses. In
the case of Dr. Li’s passing, both the censorship and the commemoration could be
considered rituals. The censorship immediately following Dr. Li’s death, including the
suppression of the #wewantfreedomofspeech hashtag is a truth-production ritual enacted
by the government, and meant to create cohesion amongst the populace. Foucault argues
that “‘Truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and
sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it” (1977, 133).
Censorship, which produces “rituals of truth” (Jiang 2012, 69), served to not only provide
6 Research from CitizenLab’s study on Coronavirus censorship on Chinese social media shows that YY, a
live-streaming platform, may actually have preemptively over-censored its platform initially, therefore
hindering everyday conversations that were entirely unrelated to COVID (Ruan, Knockel, and Crete-
Nishihata 2020). YY’s overzealous self-censorship during the initial stages of COVID indicates how some
independent companies may exceed the official censorship guidelines. This abundance of caution could be
attributed to these companies’ desire to remain free from sanctions, as well as desire to continue to have
impeded access to the Chinese market.
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a widespread, common, cohesive understanding of Dr. Li’s passing, but also allowed the
government to control the anger of netizens to prevent them from physically acting in a
way that would challenge the status quo.
The netizen commemoration of Dr. Li’s death is considered a ritual in another
aspect. Polletta identifies commemorations as a type of public ritual that can be taken
over by protest (152, 2004), which is what happened in this case. Although the public
online commemoration for Dr. Li was not a government-sponsored affair, as are most of
the commemorations that Polletta analyzes, it was still a public occurrence that was taken
over by the masses in order to protest. Netizens took over this public mourning for Dr. Li
by flooding Weibo and other social media platforms with the hashtag
#wewantfreedomofspeech, thereby turning this relatively non-political commemorative
event into an online protest with the potential to inspire (physical) collective action.
Western reporting on COVID reflects general disapproval of the Chinese
government system, indicating that the failure to contain the Coronavirus is a result of
China’s system of governing. Many news articles emphasize China’s authoritarian or
communist government as a primary reason behind the mass outbreak (Buckley 2020;
Shih, Rauhala, and Sun 2020; Wang 2020). These news articles indicate the continuing
presence of anti-authoritarianism that is reflected in Western media and the “black and
white” body of censorship literature. Arguably, Orientalism also played a role in the
portrayal of COVID censorship in Western media. As Vukovich has contended, Western
perceptions of China are influenced both by essentialized democratic tendencies, as well
as Orientalism (2012, xii, 23). Likely, both of these lenses affected Western reporting on
Coronavirus censorship. Examples of these biases (pro-democratic, Orientalist) can even
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be seen just by looking at the titles of news articles: “China Vowed to Keep Wildlife Off
the Menu, a Tough Promise to Keep” (Myers 2020), “Distrust of China Jumps to New
Highs in Democratic Nations” (Buckley 2020), and “China Peddles Falsehoods to
Obscure Origin of Covid Pandemic” (Hernández 2020) were just a few. Many of these
articles perpetuate and sensationalize cultural stereotypes about China, which Said
emphasizes as a significant component of Orientalism (1978, 26). These articles also
highlight the failings of China’s non-democratic government, illustrating the
double-othering effect Western media places on China. Western media tends to present a
narrow perspective on the Chinese Internet in general.7
Lastly, Western news media reporting on China’s handling of COVID
demonstrated that the general Western understanding of how and why the Chinese
censorship system works is flawed. Whereas many news articles reported on Internet
censorship and COVID in a style that would leave the reader to conclude that the Chinese
government directly censors its entire population’s messages, in actuality Internet
censorship is more complicated. Most Internet censorship is a result of the government
attempting to prevent collective action, as previously discussed, so when there are
massive outbreaks, or “volume bursts” of online conversation about a certain topic, that is
where the government focuses its censors (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013, 16). In addition,
most censorship is implemented through intermediary actors, such as Internet or social
media companies who self-censor their own platform’s content to remain in compliance
7 Interestingly, many Western social media platforms also undertook COVID misinformation campaigns to
censor false rumors about the Coronavirus from their apps and sites, including Facebook, Instagram,
Twitter, and YouTube (Gharib 2021, Gilbert 2020, Spring 2020). Western reporting on this Western
censorship framed it as something that was both necessary and positive. Their efforts to censor false
information are arguably not significantly different from the CCP’s efforts to censor COVID initially,
especially if the CCP’s efforts were an attempt to combat false rumors and prevent panic.
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with the government’s guidelines. These misrepresentations of COVID censorship
exemplify why it is important to have contributions to Western literature on Chinese
censorship that present censorship from a “shades of grey” perspective that accounts for
the cultural and historical factors that inform the government’s censorship. Unfortunately,
Western news media, which reaches a larger audience than academic publishing, also
generally fails to represent the intricacies of Chinese censorship.
IV. Conclusion
The topic of Chinese Internet censorship is a complicated, multifaceted one.
Under the umbrella of Chinese censorship lies various aspects, including the goal of the
government to prevent collective action, as well as the underlying motivation of
producing a shared understanding of reality. It also includes how netizens experience
Internet censorship, how they react to it, and the influences it has on online culture.
Importantly, this discussion of Chinese Internet censorship also considers how the West
interprets it, which is usually in a very critical manner, as censorship is viewed as
antithetical to Western-centric essentialized values of democracy and freedom.
There are many aspects of the Chinese Internet worth exploring. This thesis
specifically focused on censorship, its effects, its actors, and interpretations of it.
Utilizing theoretical frameworks provided by Polletta, Said, and Vukovich allow the
underlying motivations of the Chinese government to be understood. Analyzing Chinese
censorship through the lens of rituals informs the discussion of how tools for structuring
everyday life are employed by the government to create a cohesive, harmonious society
with shared values and experiences (Jiang 2012, 69). It also sheds light on how history
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and past experiences influence how a government responds to similar situations in the
modern day. Theories on the production of knowledge and truth via means of censorship
activities likewise contribute to the understanding of motivations for censorship. These
various theories assist in the full comprehension of how some authors depict China’s
Internet censorship as a means of producing common truths and a shared reality across
society. While it can be argued that Chinese censorship is partly successful in censoring
to maintain control – it is successful in preventing physical gatherings of collective action
– it has also inspired resistance to the government and its censorship. This seemingly
contradictory relationship essentially encapsulates the complex dynamics of Chinese
Internet censorship.
Internet censorship in China is full of many of these incongruities. Online speech
is restricted by the government, yet censored content is sometimes more popularized than
non-censored content (Guo 2020, 159). Censorship results in netizen discontent, and they
attempt to subvert and sometimes protest censors, but they are not seeking to inspire
major political change (Guo 2020, 125; Jiang 2020, 63). Self-censorship is apparently the
most effective and efficient way of censoring, but it has also resulted in a greater lack of
control over the Internet on the part of the Chinese government (Bamman, O’Connor, and
Smith 2019; Guo 2020, 1-2; Han 2018, 59; Shirk 2010, 1; Yang 2009, 29). Chinese
companies self-censor to access the Chinese market even though self-censorship is
harmful to their business model and oppositional to their company values (Guo 2020,
160; Han 2018, 60). Furthermore, American companies flaunt their own values of
democracy and freedom, yet some still put aside those values in order to operate in
China. Whereas for other American companies, this is not even a remote possibility
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(Meisenzahl 2019). What these examples all demonstrate is that China’s censorship is
complicated, and should be perceived in shades of grey, rather than black and white
determinations of whether it is good or bad, successful or not.
While this thesis argues for the more nuanced, “shades of grey” approach, the
“black and white” perception of China’s Internet is much more flattened. Western-centric
values of democracy and freedom, viewed as absolutes, are what informs the Western
understanding of Internet censorship. Orientalism, as a framework provided by Said, is
also a contributing influence on Western perception (Said 1978, 3). Vukovich furthers
Said’s Orientalism framework by suggesting that Western perceptions are also influenced
by essentialized perceptions of democracy, in addition to Orientalism (2012, 21).
Although the frameworks of Orientalism and democracy have different connotations,
they ultimately serve as tools to assert ideological superiority over China’s
non-democratic system and practices. It is important to include these Western
interpretations of censorship juxtaposed with how censorship is actually working, and
how it is perceived and experienced in China. This is to not only draw attention to
implicit biases Western readership might have, but also to demonstrate that situations are
often more complicated than they appear at first glance. This thesis also emphasizes the
importance of consuming Western media about China with a little more critical thought.
With that said, there of course are limitations to this paper. The most important
one being that there are so many aspects of China’s Internet that it would be impossible to
discuss all of them within the scope of this paper. As the focus of this paper is censorship,
and Western reactions and interpretations of censorship, many important cultural aspects
of Chinese Internet culture were neglected. Unfortunately, it seems to be a habit of
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scholars – including the one writing this paper – to gravitate towards writing about
censorship when addressing China’s Internet. Perhaps this is because of how unique
China’s Internet and censorship system are, especially when compared to Western
systems, or maybe it is a result of being inspired by the already existing literature and
research on the Chinese Internet, much of which also emphasizes its censorship. Even
when specifically addressing Internet censorship, there are many more facets than can be
explored in one essay, that affect how censorship is implemented, how it is perceived, and
the effect that it has on Chinese netizens. Netizens’ reactions to Western perceptions and
misunderstandings were also not comprehensively addressed, although in short, netizens
tend to have negative reactions to Western media reporting on their Internet/Internet
censorship (Jiang 2012, 4).
Further work to be done on the topic includes continuing to study the cultural
changes and effects that censorship has had on Chinese society. Specifically, one
relatively unexplored aspect is how netizen reactions to censorship have altered the way
censors work, if they have at all. It would also be interesting to see how Chinese Internet
culture would change if censors were removed, although this particular topic is probably
not a feasible point of study, at least in the foreseeable future. Looking at any effects
censorship has had on physical, non-Internet life and culture would be another relevant
topic. Another important aspect to consider would be how religious, ethnic, and cultural
minority netizens experience the Internet and censorship differently from the rest of the
population. Lastly, this area of study could use a comparative analysis between the
censorship that is mandated by the Chinese government, and implemented via
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self-censorship, and the self-imposed censorship on Western social media apps, otherwise
known as “community guidelines.”
Although it is not possible to explore every aspect of Chinese Internet censorship,
this thesis presented multiple theoretical frameworks to understand how Chinese Internet
censorship is perceived, and how different actors engage with censorship, resulting in a
complex picture of how Internet censorship affects Chinese netizens. This thesis opens
the door to further research to improve the understanding of Western interpretations and
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